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Abstract
We build a general equilibrium model of a small open economy, which
includes rule-of-thumb consumers, and staggeredd prices and wages, as well
as distortionary taxes. The analysis of government spending based on the
responses to a government spending shock under three diﬀerent rules and the
sensitivity of several impact multipliers to alternative calibrations. The eﬀect
of the shock on consumption and GDP depends on the price elasticity of
net exports; the share of rule-of-thumb consumers and domestic goods in the
government basket; and ﬁnally, the ﬁscal rule in place. Indeed the response
of consumption is more persistent with the rule that adjust spending to close
the debt-ﬁnanced deﬁcit than with the other two rules.
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11 Introduction
We build a general equilibrium model of a small open economy, which includes
rule-of-thumb consumers, and staggered pr i c e sa n dw a g e sa sw e l la sd i s t o r t i o n a r y
taxes. We concentrated on the analysis of a government spending shock under three
diﬀerent rule-based ﬁscal regimes, with and without distortionary taxation1. First,
there is a ﬁscal rule with the budget being balanced at all times. In a second rule
the tax rate is an endogenous variable and responds to both government spending
and the level of public debt, similar to the rule used in Galí, López-Salido and Vallés
(2005). A third ﬁscal rule mimics, broadly speaking, the one in place in Chile since
20012. With this rule, spending slowly reacts to any deviation from ﬁscal balance,
leading to the ﬁscal deﬁcit being countercyclical3.
The analysis of the interaction of the variables in the model is based on their
responses to the shocks and also on the sensitivity of several impact multipliers to
alternative calibrations and/or to changes in the policy parameters. The results
conﬁrm that in a small open economy, the eﬀects of government spending on con-
sumption and GDP depend on the price elasticity of net exports (Marshall-Lerner
condition), because of the currency appreciation it usually generates. If there is a
strong negative eﬀect on net exports, public spending will not be much of a stimu-
lus to the economy. In this case, the results will be consistent with the traditional
Mundell-Fleming prescription: in an open economy with ﬂexible exchange rate,
government expenditures are generally less eﬃcient as a tool to expand GDP (Blan-
chard, 2001). It is even more the case when distortionary taxes are in place. In
addition, the impact of the shock on consumption and GDP grows with the share
of rule-of-thumb consumers and domestic goods in the government basket.
The presence of distortionary taxes plays a central role when explaining how
1Recent empirical work on the eﬀects of government spending include Ramey and Shapiro
(1998), Fatás and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Mountford and Ulhig (2002),
Perotti (2002). For emerging economies see Restrepo and Rincón (2005) also Cerda, Lagos and
González (2004).
2The Chilean ﬁscal authority established that spending will be adjusted to meet the goal of
1% structural surplus. "Structural" refers here to trend revenues, which are associated with trend
GDP growth and the long-run price of copper. If GDP is growing less than its trend, government
spending will be larger than its revenues, resulting in a countercyclical ﬁscal deﬁcit. Thus, spending
will grow with trend GDP, given that it gradually reacts to structural revenues and/or to any
deviation from the 1% structural surplus. The target of a 1% structural surplus was set to cover
secular deﬁcit of the Central Bank and future pension liabilities.
3Since this is a business cycle model, our steady-state ﬁscal balance corresponds to the structural
one. Without loss of generality, instead of using a 1% surplus in steady state, we work in the model
with a balanced steady-state (structural) ﬁscal budget.
2the eﬀects of an initially debt-ﬁnanced government spending shock diﬀers under the
three alternative ﬁscal regimes. In other words, it is not innocuous how a ﬁscal
deﬁcit, initially ﬁnanced with debt and caused by a spending shock, is closed later
on. For instance, the positive response of consumption is more persistent with the
rule that adjust spending than with the rule that increases tax rates to close the
debt-ﬁnanced deﬁcit. By raising taxes, the latter rule quickly oﬀsets the initial
wealth eﬀect of rule-of-thumb households. In addition, the more aggressive is the
central bank ﬁghting inﬂa t i o n ,t h es m a l l e ri st h ei m p a c to ft h eg o v e r n m e n ts p e n d i n g
shock on consumption and the more negative is the impact on investment.
As conclusion, our sensibility analysis shows that the most important factors
inﬂuencing the eﬀect of government spending on consumption, investment, the cur-
rent account, and GDP are: the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers, the price
elasticity of exports and imports (Marshall-Lerner conditions), the share of domes-
tic goods in government consumption, the presence of distortionary taxes, and the
policy parameters in the ﬁscal and monetary rules.
This article is organized as follows. We present the model in section 2. In section
3, we discuss the calibration of the parameters and analyze the dynamic eﬀects of a
ﬁscal shock. Finally, in section 4, we summarize the results and conclude.
2M o d e l
The small open economy is similar to the one presented in many recent New-
Keynesian optimizing models with sticky prices and wages, where aggregate
demand shocks aﬀect output (Rotemberg and Woodford,1992, Clarida, Galí and
Gertler,1999). In addition, we follow Galí et al. (2005), and include two types
of households: optimizing and rule-of-thumb consumers. Moreover, we introduce
distortionary taxation. There is also a continuum of perfectly monopolistic ﬁrms.
Finally, there are monetary (central bank) and ﬁscal authorities. Fiscal policy is
rule based and three alternative ﬁscal regimes are compared.
2.1 Household
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. A fraction λ
of households consume their current labor income, do not save, and cannot smooth
their consumption because they are credit restricted (rule of thumb consumers).
Another fraction (1−λ) save, have access to capital markets, and are able to smooth
3consumption. Therefore, their intertemporal allocation between consumption and
savings is optimal (Ricardian or optimizing consumers).
2.1.1 Ricardian households
We assume that a representative Ricardian household maximizes the expected, Eo,
present value of an inﬁnite stream of utility by choosing consumption, Co
t, hours of
work, No










where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, and the utility function is U(Co
t(i),No
t (i)).
The household is subject to the budget constraint in nominal terms:
(1 + φt)PtC
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t(i) is consumption, Do






represents the country risk premium, St is the nominal exchange rate, B∗
t(i) is pri-
vate net foreign assets, Wt nominal wage rate, No
t (i) hours, Bo
t(i) government debt
held by households and φt and τt are the rates of the consumption and income
taxes, respectively. We only include income tax at the consumer level (stockholder),
considering no tax on ﬁrms’ not distributed (invested) proﬁts.
Thus, in this economy, the consumption tax could be assimilated to a value
added tax (VAT), which is commonly transferred by ﬁrms to the ﬁnal consumer.
Therefore, it aﬀects (distorts) consumption of both types of households. In the case
of Ricardian households, its change enters the Euler equation aﬀecting intertemporal
decisions. On the other hand, it reduces disposable income and consumption of all
households. In addition, both types of taxes aﬀect labor supply distorting production
(see appendix). On the contrary, taxes do not aﬀect the relative price of investment
or distort it4.
4Based on Bustos, Engel and Galetovic (2004), we implicitly assume that depreciation al-
lowances and interest payments are roughly equivalent to the cost of investment. We also assume
that ﬁrms do not internalize taxes paid by their stockholders. Those authors ﬁnd negative marginal
eﬀective corporate tax rates for large corporations in Chile and also cite Jorgenson and Landau
(1993), who ﬁnd negative eﬀective tax rates on capital in France and Italy in 1990.


















Following Galí et al. (2005), we have not listed the ﬁrst order condition for labor
supply, because we have assumed some power market for household to determine
wages.








where (1/σ) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and ϕ
is the elasticity of marginal disutility with respect to labor supply.
2.1.2 Rule-of-thumb households
Rule-of-thumb households do not save or borrow. Therefore, they always spend












Thus, they consume the wages they receive.
2.1.3 The wage schedule
Following Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), we suppose that households act as
price-setters in the labor market5. There is a representative labor aggregator, and
wages are staggered à la Calvo (1983). Therefore, wages can only be optimally
changed after some random "wage-change signal" is received. A continuum of mo-
nopolistically competitive households is assumed to exist, and each one of them
supplies a diﬀerentiated labor service to the intermediate-goods-producing sector.
The representative labor aggregator combines, with a constant returns technology,
5Another alternative consists of modeling the labor market as in Galí et al. (2005), where real
wages are determined with a general function, H, which is increasing in both consumption and
employment:Wt
Pt = H(Ct,N t,φ t,τt).
5household labor hours in the same amount ﬁrms demand them. The aggregate labor









where Nt(i) is the quantity of labor provided by each household.
The representative labor aggregator takes each household’s wage rate Wt(i) as
given, and minimizes the cost of producing a given amount of the aggregate labor
index. Then, units of labor index are sold at their unit cost Wt (with no proﬁt) to









Households set their nominal wages that maximize their intertemporal objective
function (1), subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (2), and to the total








Rule-of-thumb households set their wages equal to the average wage of optimizing
households.
2.1.4 Demand for consumption goods



















The demand for each bundle of diﬀerentiated domestic and imported goods,
derived from expenditure minimization, is given by:
C
D

































Each type of good is a composite (or weighted average) of either domestic or







































for K = D,F.
2.2 Domestic intermediate-goods ﬁrms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, indexed by j ∈ [0,1],
producing diﬀerentiated intermediate goods.
2.2.1 Cost minimization
The CES production function of the representative intermediate-good ﬁrm, indexed















where At and σs are both ≥ 0, and correspond to the technology parameter and
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, respectively.
Firms minimize costs taking the rental price of capital Rk
t and the wage Wt as
given, subject to the production function (technology). The ﬁrst-order conditions































Following Calvo (1983), when ﬁrm j receives a signal to optimally set a new price,
it chooses the price that maximizes the discounted value of its proﬁts, conditional



































































Then, under the assumed price-setting structure, ﬁrms that did not receive the
signal cannot adjust their prices, while all those that are allowed to optimally reset
their prices choose the same price P∗
t . Thus, the dynamics of the domestic price
index PD


















2.3 Intermediate-goods importing ﬁrms
The import sector buys a homogenous good produced abroad, and using a linear
technology turns it into a diﬀerentiated import good for the home market. As in
the domestic good sector, importing ﬁrms also receive a random signal to optimally
set a new price when the exchange rate or the foreign price has changed (Smets and
Wouters, 2002). Thus, there is no perfect pass-through and the dynamics of the
8import price index is also described by an equation similar to (24). However, the
ﬁrms that are allowed to optimally reset their price, set it equal to the import price
abroad in terms of domestic currency StPF∗


















2.4 Optimizing investment ﬁrms
The ﬁrms that produce homogenous capital goods rent them to the intermediate-
goods ﬁrms. All of them are owned by Ricardian households.
2.4.1 Tobin’s Q





















subject to capital accumulation
K
o






















































T h em a r g i n a lc o s to fa na d d i t i o n a lu n i to fi n v e s t m e n ts h o u l db ee q u a lt ot h e
present value of the marginal increase in equity that it generates (Tobin’s Q).
2.4.2 Demand for investment goods



















The demand for domestic and imported goods derived from expenditure mini-
mization is given by:
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Each composite of investment goods is itself a bundle of diﬀerentiated goods.



























Aggregate consumption corresponds to the weighted sum of consumption by Ricar-
dian and rule of thumb households
Ct = λC
r













Given that only Ricardian households invest and accumulate capital, total in-
vestment is equal to (1 − λ) times the optimizing investment:
It =( 1− λ)(I
o
t ) (37)
Similarly, the aggregate stock of capital is equal to
Kt =( 1− λ)(K
o
t) (38)
Hours worked are a weighted average of labor supplied by each type of consumer:
Nt = λN
r
t +( 1− λ)N
o
t (39)






Financial assets are only held by optimizing households:
Bt =( 1− λ)(B
o
t) (41)
Foreign assets (or debt) includes ﬁscal BG∗










The central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to the following rule:
rt = r + φππ + φyy (43)
with φπ ≥ 1 and r being the neutral or steady state nominal interest rate. This
rule is similar to the well known Taylor (1993) rule. In our baseline simulation,
φy=0.
2.6 Fiscal policy
The government budget constraint is
P
G



















t+1 − Bt − StB
G∗
t






















Thus, revenues are net of investment and include proﬁts of the import sector.
For simplicity, we assume that whenever the government issues debt it maintains




We propose a general ﬁscal rule that may encompass a wide range of diﬀerent cases.
Letting gt = Gt−G
Y , tt = Tt−T


























= φbBt + φgP
G
t Gt (46)
In order to have an interpretation of this rule, we choose some cases. if ψ,ω =1 ,
the general rule becomes similar to the one proposed by Galí et al. (2005), where in
order to return to equilibrium tax rates (in consumption tax instead of a lump-sum





















= φbBt + φgP
G
t Gt (47)
If ψ = ω = φg =1and φb =0 , we are dealing with a balanced budget, where
























We consider a third rule, where the government adjusts spending, instead of
taxes, to go back to equilibrium, whenever facing a debt-ﬁnanced ﬁscal deﬁcit. In
the meantime, the level of debt will grow up to the point where revenues and ex-
penditures equilibrate again. This new level of debt will remain forever unless there
is a shock that could take it to an even higher level or that increases revenues and
allows the government to run transitory surpluses and reduce its outstanding debt.
In other words, government debt follows a random walk6.I nt h i sc a s et h ec o e ﬃcients
would be ψ = ω =0and φg =1 , so the rule becomes
P
G











Note that while the other rules include current tax revenue:
6The Chilean ﬁscal rule of structural overall surplus assures the ﬁnancial solvency of the govern-
ment in the long run. However, it could still be possible under this rule to accumulate substantial
debt were the assumptions regarding potential GDP and the long-run copper price for several years
misaligned. Indeed, if authorities’ perception (or, in the case of Chile, the group of independent
analysts) regarding these two unknown variables only adjust slowly when persistent changes have
taken place, continuous deﬁcit or surpluses are possible, given that they deﬁne the actual overall
ﬁscal deﬁcit or surplus allowed each period (see Restrepo, 2005).





















this rule considers steady-state (structural) taxes IT. However, we cannot use such
a rule in our model because it would not converge, given that public debt corresponds
to a random walk. For that reason, we allow the debt to have some weight in the
rule. In such a way, the government expenditure has to pay the interest of the debt









Bt+ µxBt. In other words, government spending
should also react to the level of debt B, with elasticity µx =0 .001, so debt will
slowly converge back to the steady-state level.
P
G











t vb + µx
i
. Therefore, φb is not constant in this






because in steady state not only the budget is balanced (but also B
g
=0 ) 7.
Plugging the rule in the budget constraint, a necessary and suﬃcient condition























,ψ= ω =0 . (52)
2.6.2 Government demand for goods



















The demand for domestic and imported goods is derived from expenditure min-
imization and is given by:
G
D








7As it is well known, the linearization of the model involves a tradeoﬀ: understanding and
























































for K = D,F.
2.7 Market clearing conditions






























Therefore, the supply of domestic goods equals the sum of consumption, invest-












The economy equilibrium is:
14PtCt + P
G
t Gt + P
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3 Calibration and Dynamics
The model is ﬁrst linearized (see the appendix), then the system of stochastic dif-
ference equations is solved with Dynare (Juillard, 2003)8.
3.1 Calibration
The most important parameter values in our baseline simulation are set to equal
standard values found in the literature and summarized in table 1. For instance, the
discount factor β, is set at 0.99. The risk aversion coeﬃcient in the consumption
function is 1. We follow Galí et al. (2005) setting the elasticity of substitution
across intermediate goods ε= 6 ,a n dt h er a t eo fd e p r e c i a t i o nδ is 0.02. On the other
hand, the share of rule-of-thumb consumers amounts to 0.5. Finally, we impose a





of 0.21 at all times.
The policy parameters include: the share of domestic goods in the government
basket of consumption αG= 0 . 9 ,a sw e l la st h ec o e ﬃcients in the monetary rule with
respect to inﬂation and the output gap φπ=1.5, the original value used in Taylor
(1993), and φy=0, given that in our baseline simulation the monetary rule only
includes inﬂation. However, we report sensibility analysis which were run in order
to check how diﬀerent values of both parameters aﬀect the impact of government
spending shocks. Finally, other policy parameters are the ones included in one of
the ﬁscal rules, where taxes react endogenously to ﬁscal deﬁcits, φg=0.30 and public
debt φb=0.12 similarly to the rule used in Galí et al. (2005)9.
In steady state consumption is set at 62% of GDP, government spending is 20%
and so are tax revenues, since the overall government budget is assumed to be
balanced in steady state10. This is equivalent to assuming structural balance –
instead of the structural surplus adopted in Chile. The ratio of investment to GDP
8The software is available at: http://www.cepremap.cnrs.fr/dynare
9The consumption tax rate is the one that changes in order to regain ﬁscal equilibrium here,
while in Galí et al. (2005), the tax that reacts is lump-sum.
10Several parameters used to calibrate the steady state are taken from Restrepo and Soto (2004).
15is 17%, exports are 34%, while imports are slightly less than that 33%, given that
the trade surplus covers the steady state interest payments on a 50% of GDP level
of foreign private debt (table2).
3.2 Eﬀects of ﬁscal spending shocks
The eﬀects of a government spending shock on our economy are shown in ﬁgure
1, that includes the response of a selected group of variables: GDP, consumption,
investment, real interest rate, inﬂation, hours of work, real wage, real exchange rate,
current account, ﬁscal deﬁcit and nominal interest rate. Each small ﬁgure depicts the
response of the respective variable under the three diﬀerent ﬁscal regimes, namely
endogenous tax, endogenous spending and permanently-balanced budget.
1. The contemporaneous response of consumption to a government spending
shock is positive, except under the rule of an always-balanced budget. Thus, the
rules are responsible for the diﬀerences in the responses of consumption, which are
also reﬂe c t e do ns i g n i ﬁcant diﬀerences in the responses of the current account, the
real wage, the real exchange rate and obviously the ﬁscal deﬁcit.
Indeed, the results show that:
i) after the shock, consumption drops with the balanced-budget rule because
the positive wealth eﬀe c tt h a tb e n e ﬁts rule-of-thumb consumers is partly oﬀset by
higher taxes on their income and consumption. Besides, the distortion on consump-
tion and the negative wealth eﬀect on Ricardian consumers are both so large with
this rule that they counteract the positive wealth eﬀect received by rule-of-thumb
consumers, causing a deep fall in consumption, even in the presence of a signiﬁcant
real appreciation. The consumption reduction is mirrored by the strong current
account improvement. The large current account surplus causes a reduction in total
foreign debt and the risk premium, which are associated with the strong exchange
rate appreciation (the IS curve comes back). As a result, the composition of aggre-
gate demand (GDP) changed.
ii) The spending hike has the largest positive impact on consumption with the
rule that adjust taxes (consumption tax) after the shock. It happens because the
negative wealth eﬀect suﬀered by Ricardian households is more than compensated by
the increase in income and consumption experienced by rule-of-thumb agents. How-
ever the positive eﬀect does not last long and becomes negative after two quarters,
similarly to what happens with the balanced-budget rule because taxes increase
signiﬁcantly in order to take the budget back to equilibrium. Hence, the initial
16wealth gain of rule-of-thumb consumers is quickly reversed. At this time the eﬀect
on optimizers is still negative.
iii) Under the ﬁscal regime that adjusts spending in order to gradually
return to equilibrium, total consumption increases less than with the last rule but
the positive eﬀect is very persistent, lasting eight to nine quarters. This happens even
though inﬂation and the interest rate have the highest and more persistent increase.
Moreover, the increment in the wage bill of rule-of-thumb consumers is smaller here
than with the other two rules, because real wages do not move up signiﬁcantly.
What is diﬀerent here is that under the endogenous spending rule, tax distortions
though not absent are smaller because tax rates do not move. Thus, the increase
in tax revenues with this rule (ﬁgure 1), is an endogenous resul to ft h ei n c r e a s ei n
GDP after the shock. On the other hand, the real exchange rate appreciates less
than when either of the other two rules operate, because the appreciating pressure of
ﬁscal spending is partially oﬀset by the force towards depreciation coming from the
larger and more persistent current account deﬁcit, and level of foreign debt, which
is also associated with a higher country risk premium.
2. The eﬀect of government spending on consumption and GDP depends also
on the reaction of the real exchange rate, exports, and imports after the shock. A
standard statement regarding open economies with ﬂexible exchange rate regimes is
that ﬁscal policy is less eﬀective expanding the economy, given that it has a negative
eﬀect on net exports11. To check this result in our model, we obtained the impact
multipliers (after a government spending shock) as a function of the price elasticity
of export demand, and as a function of the price elasticity of imports, which in our
baseline simulation are both 1.012. Figure 2 shows that the impact of the shock on
GDP, consumption, the current account, worked hours, the real wage and inﬂation
decreases whenever the elasticity of exports grows. The transmission mechanism
works through the real exchange rate. Indeed, a real appreciation takes place after
the shock, which engineers a reduction in total net exports by making domestic
goods more expensive or, the same, foreign goods cheaper. The more negative the
reaction of net exports to the real currency appreciation, the less expansive the
public spending shock and the smaller the impact multiplier. The eﬀect of the
shock, at impact, on hours (employment) falls along with its impact on aggregate
11In the IS-LM jargon, what happens is that the IS comes back after the expansion due to the
subsequent reduction of the real exchange rate, lowering exports and aggregate demand.
12The eﬀect of a depreciation (appreciation) depends on the elasticities of export and import
demands. After a depreciation, the trade account will improve if the Marshall-Lerner conditions
hold, as it happens in our case.
17demand, particularly on consumption, investment and net exports.
Similarly, whenever we increase the price elasticity of imports, there is a reduction
in the impact of the spending shock on GDP, consumption, investment, current
account, real wage and hours, as can be seen in ﬁgure 3. At the same time, and
pulling the appreciation of the real exchange rate is, at impact, smaller.
Therefore, there are two opposite forces pushing and pulling the real exchange
rate. On one hand, government spending puts downward pressure on the real ex-
change rate. On the other, the resulting debt-ﬁnanced ﬁscal and current account
deﬁcits increase the country risk premium and pushes the real exchange rate up. The
l a t t e ri sas m a l l e re ﬀect that only comes out in a general equilibrium framework and
was typically missing in the Mundell-Fleming models. In ﬁgure 4,w ei l l u s t r a t e
this eﬀect by showing the evolution of the impact multipliers when we change the
debt elasticity of the country risk premium. The impact of the spending shock on
the variables is very diﬀerent for each rule. Nevertheless, one can state that the real
exchange rate appreciation is smaller with the two rules that allow the surging of a
debt-ﬁnanced deﬁcit after the shock, but the eﬀe c ti sm o r es i g n i ﬁcant with the rule
that has taxes reacting endogenously to the ﬁscal deﬁcit and public debt.
3. Distortionary taxes play a signiﬁcant role in the economy. The diﬀerences
generated by the three rules partly come from the distortion on consumption and
labor supply created by both taxes, as becomes clear from comparing ﬁgures 1 and
5. Indeed, ﬁgure 5 shows the responses of the variables to a government spending
shock when taxes are lump sum instead of being distortionary, as is the case in ﬁgure
1.
For instance, the eﬀect of government spending on consumption is larger with
lump-sum taxes than with distortionary ones. Indeed, if the economy has only lump-
sum taxes, consumption reacts more after the shock resulting in higher responses of
inﬂation and real interest rates jointly with a lower response of the current account
balance. On the contrary, if distortionary taxes are in place, the change in the tax
rate on consumption that follows the spending spike distorts negatively the level of
consumption with two out of the three rules. In fact, the tax change that occurs
after the shock impacts negatively rule-of-thumb consumers and appears in the Euler
equation of optimizing consumers aﬀecting their decisions (see linearized model in
the appendix).
It is important to point out that when the ﬁscal rule is built in such a way that
government spending, instead of taxes, reacts endogenously in order to gradually
go back to the target of a balanced budget (equilibrium), the positive eﬀect of the
18shock on consumption is much more persistent than with the other rules and so is
the eﬀect of the shock on inﬂation and the real interest rate, with a negative eﬀect
on investment.
In addition, the reaction of real wages varies signiﬁcantly depending on whether
taxes are lump sum or not. While real wages increase after the shock in the presence
of distortionary taxes with all three rules, they fall when taxes are lump sum with
the two ﬁscal regimes where taxes react endogenously. It happens mostly because
in the ﬁrst case inﬂation is lower and labor supply falls. Finally, the real exchange
rate falls less with lump sum taxes because net exports are smaller. So debt is larger
and the country risk premium is higher.13
3.3 Sensibility analysis
To understand better how our economy works and to check the robustness of some
results, several sensibility exercises are carried out. The exercises allow us to pin
down the interaction of aggregate demand variables with a set of parameters of
the model, in order to see, after the same government spending shock, how the
impact multipliers of a group of variables change depending on the share of rule of
thumb consumers λ, the degree of wage rigidity θw, the composition of government
expenditures αG,a sw e l la st h es i z eo ft h ec o e ﬃcients in the monetary (φπ and φy),
and ﬁscal (φb and φg) rules. The sensibility analysis shows that in several cases the
impact multipliers change not only size but also sign.
3.3.1 Model parameters
Figure 6 shows how the impact of the shock on each of the selected variables
changes when the share of rule-of-thumb consumers λ,g r o w sf r o m0 to 0.5, half
of a percentage point (0.05) at a time. It is clear that the eﬀect of the shock on
consumption, starting from being negative, grows with the share of rule-of-thumb
consumers. The negative impact the shock has on the wealth of Ricardian (forward-
looking) consumers is more than oﬀset by the positive wealth eﬀect received by rule
of thumbers, who spend all their income. This result is in line with the ﬁndings of
Galí et al. (2005) for a closed economy. The impact of the shock on GDP, inﬂation,
and real interest rates also grows with the presence of credit-restricted consumers.
13As a way of checking the functioning of the model we also introduced a monetary shock and
a shock to the price of exports. The responses are consistent with economic intuition in all cases.
However, we do not report them here.
19On the other hand, the impact on the current account and the real exchange rate is
more negative with a larger share of them.
The results that show how the impact on the variables changes with the degree
of wage rigidity θw are reported in ﬁgure 7. T h em o r er i g i dn o m i n a lw a g e st h e
smaller the impact of government spending on real wages, i.e., prices grow faster
than nominal wages. Simultaneously, while the impact on consumption is slightly
larger, it clearly increases more signiﬁcantly on hours (employment) and is less
negative on investment and the real exchange rate. Also, when wages are more
rigid, inﬂation and the real interest rate grow less after the shock. The current
account balance decreases, but not signiﬁcantly.
3.3.2 Policy parameters
In ﬁgure 8, we report how the impact of the shock on each variable varies with the
composition of government expenditures αG. The more the government spends on
domestic goods the larger its impact on aggregate consumption, GDP, employment,
inﬂation and the interest rate, no matter which of the three rules is in place. At the
same time, the impact of the shock on the current account is less negative, given
that each time the government is spending less on imported goods. Where the rules
diﬀer most is in the impact of the shock on investment. In fact, with the endogenous
spending rule, the impact of the shock on investment is more negative than with the
other rules, even though in all cases the negative eﬀect decreases whenever the local
component of goverment spending grows. Two elements play a role regarding the
impact on investment: the real interest rate, and the price of capital. Under this
speciﬁc rule, the demand for capital and its price are smaller at impact, discouraging
investment14.
The relation between the size of the impact of the shock on the variables and
the coeﬃcients in the monetary rule (φπ and φy)a r es h o w ni nﬁgures 9 and 10,
respectively. The results show the interaction between monetary and ﬁscal policies.
For instance, the more aggressive the central bank is ﬁghting inﬂation (larger φπ),
the smaller is the impact of the government spending shock on consumption and
m o r en e g a t i v ei st h ei m p a c to ni n v e s t m e n t .I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ei m p a c to ft h es h o c ko n
the real interest rate is obviously larger. Consistently with the latter, the impact of
the shock gets smaller each time, in the case of inﬂation, and more negative in the
14To some extent, capital is substituted for labor, given that real wages are also lower in this
case than with the other two rules.
20case of the real exchange rate (ﬁgure 9). When the rule with endogenous tax rates
is in place, ﬁgure 9 shows that even with a strong reaction to inﬂation (larger φπ)
the impact of the shock on GDP is still large, making it more diﬃcult for monetary
authorities to get close to a ﬂexible price equilibrium allocation. We believe that is
a consequence of the introduction of wages rigidity in the model15.
If monetary policy cares more about stabilizing output (larger φy), the impact
of the spending shock on GDP is smaller i.e. authorities dislike deviations of output
from potential (steady state) even if they are positive (ﬁgure 10). As a consequence,
interest rates move strongly upwards in order to counteract the aggregate demand
hike, reducing consumption, investment, the real exchange rate, employment and
inﬂation. On the contrary, each time we increase the coeﬃcient φy,t h ei m p a c to f
t h es h o c ko nr e a lw a g e si sm o r ep o s i t i v ed u et ot h ed e ﬂation that the policy reaction
engineers. This exercise conﬁrms what we said above: the impact of the spending
shock on GDP and consumption is larger when the ﬁscal regime in place is the one
with endogenous taxes. However, we also know from above, that with this rule
the eﬀect on consumption is less persistent than in the case of a ﬁscal regime with
endogenous spending, because tax growth counteracts the wealth eﬀect and distorts
consumption.
The sensibility of the results to changes in the parameters of the ﬁscal rules,
only apply to the rule where tax rates react endogenously to what happens with
spending φg and the level of the debt φb. The larger those parameters, the faster
the economies return to equilibrium. In other words, the ﬁscal authority is more
intolerant to deﬁcit or debt levels deviating from equilibrium. In ﬁgure 11,t h i s
rule is equivalent to the one that always keeps the budget balanced when φg=1.
If φg>1,the ﬁscal authority reacts more than what is needed to close the deﬁcit,
which results in reduced consumption and GDP. Figure 12 shows that the impact
multipliers of consumption, investment and output grow slightly with φb. Therefore,
as m a l lφg combined with a large φb produces a larger response of consumption and
output to the shock, as was also found by Galí et al. (2005).
4 Summary and Conclusions
We build a general equilibrium (business cycle) model of a small open economy,
that includes rule-of-thumb consumers, and sticky prices and wages as well as dis-
15Galí et al. (2005) and in particular Blanchard and Galí (2005) discuss this issue extensively.
21tortionary taxes. The economic structure is used to study the eﬀects of government
spending under three diﬀerent ﬁscal regimes by: i) comparing the responses of the
variables to government spending shock, with and without distortionary taxation;
ii) running a set of exercises to see the change of the initial impact of the shock
on the variables when the value of several parameters of the model are purposively
modiﬁed within a range (one at a time).
The ﬁrst rule-based ﬁscal regime keeps the budget balanced at all times. In the
second, taxes react endogenously to both government spending and the level of debt.
The third ﬁscal rule roughly mimics the one in place in Chile since 2001. With this
rule, spending reacts slowly to any deviation from ﬁscal balance, leading to the ﬁscal
deﬁcit being strongly countercyclical.
Being this a small open economy, the impact of government spending on con-
sumption and other variables changes with the value of the respective price elasticity
of exports and imports (trade balance). In other words, the eﬀects of the spending
shock depend on the Marshall-Lerner conditions. If exports are more elastic, the
impact of government spending on consumption, output and the current account
is smaller. This last result is consistent with the traditional conclusion based on
the Mundell-Fleming model about open economies with ﬂexible exchange rates. In
this case, government spending is less eﬃcient than monetary policy expanding the
economy. In addition, a sensibility analysis shows that the positive reaction of con-
sumption to the government spending shock grows with the share of rule-of-thumb
c o n s u m e r sa n dt h ep r o p o r t i o no fd o m e s t i cg o o d si n c l u d e di ng o v e r n m e n te x p e n d i -
tures.
Moreover, the positive eﬀect of the spending shock on consumption is more
persistent with the rule that slowly adjust spending than with the rule that increases
tax rates to close the debt-ﬁnanced deﬁc i t .T h el a t t e rr u l eq u i c k l yo ﬀsets the initial
wealth eﬀect on rule-of-thumb households by raising taxes.The results also show that
the response of consumption is larger when taxes are lump-sum than when they are
distortionary.
The sensibility analysis shows that the degree of wage rigidity aﬀects the impact
of the shock on consumption only marginally. On the contrary, when wages are more
rigid the impact of the government spending hike on investment, hours, inﬂation and
the real exchange rate increases more signiﬁcantly. Finally, the more aggressive is
the central bank ﬁghting inﬂation, the smaller is the impact of the government
spending shock on consumption and the more negative is the impact on investment.
In conclusion, our analysis shows that the most important factors inﬂuencing the
22eﬀect of government spending on consumption, investment, the current account, and
GDP are: the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers, the price elasticity of exports
and imports (Marshall-Lerner conditions), the share of domestic goods in govern-
ment consumption, the presence of distortionary taxes, and the ﬁscal and monetary
rules.
5 Appendix: Linearized Model
For the solution of the model we linearize the model equations around a non-
stochastic steady state.




































Then, aggregate consumption is given by
ct = λc
r
t +( 1− λ)c
o
t
































τt − ϕnt − σct
¸


















t+1 +( 1− β (1 − δ))(r
k
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We assume a risk premium of the form:
b Φt = b
∗
t+1 + du ∗ (st − pt) − du ∗ yt
















































The production function can be expressed as:
yt = a + ϕckt +( 1− ϕc)nt
Uncovered interest parity condition is:
rt − πt+1 =
³
(st+1 − pt+1) − (st − pt)+r
∗
t + ρb Φt
´
25Real interest rate (ex-ante) is deﬁned as
r_ext = rt − πt+1



























We assume that the inﬂation equation for imported goods is also given by the











where the marginal cost of imports is determined by
mc
F








In order to solve the model we need to deﬁne the following relative prices:

















































































































































































































































Aggregate inﬂation is given by:
πt = χπ
F
t +( 1− χ)π
D
t

















































We add the following monetary policy rule
rt = r + φππt + φπyt + u
r
t
The cases for the ﬁscal policy are









































































In this case government expenditure and income tax are exogenous, they evolve
according to a ﬁrst order autoregressive processes:
gt = ρggt−1 +  
g
t
τt = ρττt−1 +  
τ
t























In this case both taxes follow a ﬁrst order autoregressive process:
τt = ρττt−1 +  
τ
t
28φt = ρφφt−1 +  
φ
t






t−1 +  
g
t
Case 3 where ψ = ω = φg =1and φb =0 .The ﬁscal rule is given by the















































































where income tax and government expenditure also evolve according to ﬁrst order
autoregressive processes:
gt = ρggt−1 +  
g
t
τt = ρττt−1 +  
τ
t
















































































Other exogenous shocks evolve according to ﬁrst order autoregressive processes
as well:
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327 Tables
Table 1: Baseline Parameters
Discount factor β 0.99
Risk aversion coeﬃcient σ 1.00
Weight of rule-of-thumb consumers λ 0.50
Rate of depreciation δ 0.02
Elasticity of investment with respect to Tobin’s Q η 1.00
Elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods εD,ε F 6.00
Parameter of CES production function α 0.33
Fraction of ﬁrms that keep their prices unchanged θD,θ F 0.75
Fraction of wages that remain unchanged ξw 0.75
Elasticity of substitution across hours worked θw 6.0
Elasticity of substitution between capital and labor σs 1.00
Response of monetary authority to inﬂation φπ 1.50
Response of monetary authority to output φy 0
Response of ﬁscal authority to government spending φg 0.12
Response of ﬁscal authority to public debt φb 0.30
Autoregressive coeﬃcient government expenditure shock ρg 0.90
Autoregressive coeﬃcient lump-sum taxes shock ρu 0.90
Autoregressive coeﬃcient monetary shock ρr 0.70
Weight of domestic good in consumption αc 0.75
Weight of domestic good in investment αI 0.50
Weight of domestic good in government expenditure αG 0.90
Foreign-domestic good (consumption) elasticity of substitution ηC 0.99
Foreign-domestic good (investment) elasticity of substitution ηI 0.99
Foreign-domestic good (government) elasticity of substitution ηG 0.99






Inverse of the elasticity of work eﬀort with respect to real wage ϕ 0.2
Table 2: Steady State Values
Consumption output ratio C
Y 0.62
External debt output ratio B∗
Y 0.50
Investment output ratio I
Y 0.17
Export output ratio X
Y 0.34
Import output ratio Y F
Y 0.33
Government expending output ratio G
Y 0.2
338 Figures
Figure 1: Shock to Government Spending with Distortionary Taxes








































































34Figure 2: Impact Multipliers and Price Elasticity of Exports
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Figure 3: Impact Multipliers and Price Elasticity of Imports




























































35Figure 4: Impact Multipliers and Elasticity of risk Premium to Foreign Debt

































































Figure 5: Shock to Government Spending with Lump Sum Taxes








































































36Figure 6: Impact Multipliers and Share of Rule-of-thumb Consumers



































































Figure 7: Impact Multipliers and Wage Rigidity































































37Figure 8: Impact Multipliers and Government Spending Basket
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Figure 9: Taylor Rule: coeﬃcient on inﬂation
































































38Figure 10: Taylor Rule: coeﬃcient on output gap
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Figure 11: Fiscal Rule Government Spending Coeﬃcient
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